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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In competitive games, one’s predictably often leads to one’s downfall. The more 
unpredictable a player is, the more success he will find in the field. “The theory of mixed-
strategy play, including von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem… remains the cornerstone of 
our theoretical understanding of strategic situations that require unpredictability” (Walker 
and Wooders, 2001). Professional sports have offered economists a means to test the 
minimax theory1 in a natural setting. However, studies have varied so far on whether 
professional athletes follow equilibrium play.  
Kovash and Levitt (2009) add to the literature of minimax play in professional 
sports. Using OPS2 to test minimax play in Major League pitchers, they find that pitchers 
deviate from minimax play. We reexamine Kovash and Levitt’s (2009) conclusion using 
                                                           
1
 Minimax theory states that players seek to equalize payoffs and choose strategies without serial 
correlation.  
2
 OPS - On base percentage plus Slugging percentage. For a more information, refer to appendix A. 
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data from every pitcher in the Major Leagues over the period 2007-2010 – a total of 
almost 2,400 pitchers. We test to see whether pitchers continue to overuse fastballs, and 
whether the OPS statistic contributes to a pitcher’s value.  
We find that starting pitchers tend to throw too many fastballs, as an increase in 
fastball use leads to an increase in OPS. These results agree with Kovash and Levitt’s 
(2009) conclusions. However, this study finds deviations from their conclusions in the 
case of relief pitchers. We find no significant effect of pitch types on OPS, suggesting 
that the pitch choice of relief pitchers may adhere to minimax play. This study also 
concludes that the OPS, along with the K/BB and HR/9 statistics,3 are good indicators of 
a pitcher’s value. IP4 also helps explain a pitcher’s WAR5, but its inherent endogeneity 
makes it difficult to gauge how useful this statistic is.   
 These findings are not trivial. During the 2010 season, starting pitchers threw 
fewer fastballs than they did in any of the previous three seasons. Accordingly, 2010 saw 
season bests in many pitching categories compared to any of the previous three seasons. 
In addition, our findings on OPS and WAR suggest that a team that properly exploits 
these statistics can find undervalued pitchers that can help win more games.  
                                                           
3
 K/BB – strikeout to walk ratio. HR/9 – home runs given up per nine innings. For more information, refer 
to Appendix A. 
4
 IP – innings pitched. For more information, refer to Appendix A. 
5
 Wins Above Replacement - a statistic that tries to quantify a player’s value relative to the rest of the 
league. For more information, refer to Appendix A. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before Walker and Wooders’ (2001) study, tests on minimax theory were 
performed in controlled laboratories (O’Neill, 1987). Minimax studies in natural settings 
had not been performed until Walker and Wooders (2001). They analyzed field data from 
ten professional tennis matches in order to test the minimax theory in a natural setting. 
They observed that win rates in the serve and return play of top professional tennis 
players were consistent with the minimax theory. However, the players’ choices were not 
consistent with the serial independence implied by the minimax theory, as even the best 
tennis player switched too often from one action to another (Walker and Wooders, 2001).  
Two years later, Ignacio Palacios-Huerta (2003) published an examination on the 
minimax theory in a different sport.  He analyzed penalty shots in professional soccer, 
testing whether soccer players remained consistent with equilibrium play.  His results 
reflected a consistency with equilibrium play in every respect: (i) winning probabilities 
were statistically identical across strategies for players; (ii) players’ choices were serially
 8 
 
independent (Palacios-Huerta, 2003). This paper is important because it was the first time 
the minimax theorem was fully supported in the field. 
Kovash and Levitt (2009) refute Palacios-Huerta’s (2003) conclusion on the 
minimax theory. Observing all pitches thrown during the regular season from 2002 to 
2006 and play calling patterns of NFL teams from 2001 to 2005, they conclude that 
professionals’ choices do not follow the minimax theory. Using OPS as an indicator of a 
pitch’s success, Kovash and Levitt (2009) conclude that pitchers throw too many 
fastballs, as batters systematically have better outcomes when thrown fastballs versus any 
other type of pitch. Additionally, the pattern of pitches is particularly predictable. 
Pitchers are more likely to throw a non-fastball if the previous pitch was a fastball, and 
vice versa. In contrast to Palacios-Huerta (2003), they find substantial deviations from 
minimax behavior, both with respect to equalizing payoffs and serially correlated actions. 
Kovash and Levitt’s estimate that the failure to follow minimax play results in the 
average team giving up an extra 20 runs a season, resulting in a loss of $4 million a year 
for the typical baseball team.6  
While Kovash and Levitt (2009) calculate all pitches thrown from 2002-2006, 
they fail to factor the differences in pitching strategies between starting and relief 
pitchers. Starting pitchers throw more innings and have to throw more fastballs. They are 
exposed to batters for a longer period of time, providing batters with information on a 
                                                           
6
 The rule of thumb in converting runs to win is: 10 runs = 1 win (Dave Cameron). Thus, by giving up an 
extra 20 runs, a team loses two extra games a season, and these two games can make a difference. In 2010, 
the San Diego Padres lost two more games than the division winners San Francisco Giants, and they were 
denied a spot to the 2010 playoffs. Seeing as how the San Francisco Giants won the 2010 World Series, we 
can see how two games play such a significant role to teams. Moreover, according to MLB Average 
Postseason Ticket Revenue over the last decade, making the playoffs can net a gain of up to $15.7 million 
dollars for the average team owner. 
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starter’s pitch types, velocities, and tendencies. Thus, starters concentrate on varying their 
pitching strategies in order to effectively retire their opposition  
Relief pitchers throw considerably fewer innings.7 Because they are exposed to 
batters for a shorter period of time, batters do not have as much information on a 
reliever’s pitch types, velocities, and tendencies. Even though scouting reports exist, 
batters still must get used to the tendencies of the new pitcher. They must retime the 
pitches, learn new tendencies, and expect different pitch types and movements. Relief 
pitchers also tend to face a lineup only once before making way for another pitcher, 
resetting a batter’s learning curve. This is not to say that relief pitchers do not mix their 
pitches as well. However, they can afford to throw more fastballs due to their shorter 
exposure, possibly skewing the data set that Kovash and Levitt (2009) use. In addition, 
relief pitchers typically have only two pitch types in their repertoire, whereas starting 
pitchers typically use four. Thus, relievers have fewer options to begin with; they 
inevitably have to throw their fastball more often in order to keep the batters off-balance. 
With such differences, it might be difficult to make general conclusions that pitchers 
throw too many fastballs.  
 This paper seeks to remedy this oversight, by separately analyzing starters and 
relievers. This study also tests whether OPS is a good indicator of a pitcher’s value. 
Further possible studies on this topic can explore the differences in strategies between 
relief pitchers and starting pitchers, test minimax play within relief pitchers using a more 
specific data set or test the minimax theory in other sports. 
  
                                                           
7
 From the years 2007-2010, starting pitchers threw 1,837,343 pitches in which 1,102,405 were fastballs. 
Meanwhile, relief pitchers threw 951,377 pitches in which 951,377  were fastballs. 
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Chapter 3 
Data Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our data on pitching statistics in Major League Baseball was collected from 
Fangraphs.com.8 The data set includes information for each pitcher in the major leagues 
over the 2007 to 2010 regular season, particularly concentrating on pitch type percentage, 
OPS, WAR, and IP. The data for OPS was retrieved from ESPN’s player statistics page. 
Our raw data covers every starting and relieving pitcher from 2007-2010. After 
separating starting and relieving pitchers as well as excluding pitchers who have thrown 
fewer than ten innings, we end up with 1,040 starting pitchers and 1,358 relief pitchers.  
A risk of selection bias exists. Kovash and Levitt look at all pitchers from 2002-
2006, while we concentrate on 2007 to 2010. Due to many time-dependent issues such as 
steroid/HGH usage9 and other regulations, this difference may seem like an “apple to 
                                                           
8
 Fangraphs serves as an advanced baseball statistics encyclopedia as well as a comprehensive database for 
baseball statistics that go as far back as 1974.  
9
 Refers to the use of performance enhancing drugs such as steroids or Human Growth Hormone that was 
often credited for increased home run production and inflated offensive statistics in the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s.  
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orange” comparison. Still our results are valid because of our focus on relative 
performance. Steroid/HGH usage would not eliminate established baseball strategies or 
the relative successes of some pitchers versus others. Variables that existed from 2002-
2006 would still be in-play in 2007-2010. While outcomes in absolute terms might differ 
due to a chemically-enhanced offense, we observe relative performance.10 
Tables 1 and 2 present the summary statistics for both types of pitchers, reporting 
the average, maximum, and minimum recordings of each explanatory variable for both 
starting and relief pitchers from 2007-2010. The bottom section of each table reports the 
summary statistics of pitch types and velocities thrown during the 2007-2010 seasons. 
Over the sample years, OPS has decreased for both starters and relievers while WAR has 
increased. Fastballs remain the most common pitch. While relievers’ reliance on the 
fastball has stayed the same over the period 2007-2010, starting pitchers’ reliance has 
dropped 3%. This drop accounts for approximately 6,000 less fastballs in 2010 compared 
to 2007. Starting pitchers throw around 105 innings on average from 2007 to 2009, only 
to see a jump of 15 innings to 120.63 innings in 2010. Foreshadowing our results, 2010 
reported the lowest fastball reliance for starting pitchers, the same year in which pitchers 
recorded season bests in many different statistics.11 The data does not show any spike of 
this caliber for relief pitchers.  
Tables 3 and 4 report the correlation matrix of all explanatory variables for 
starting and relieving pitchers respectively. For starting pitchers, the IP statistic is 
                                                           
10
 The only caveat of this assumption would probably be a fly-ball pitcher who might have given up more 
homeruns during the steroids era than he does now, but in general, these time-dependent issues would 
affect hitters much more than pitchers. 
11
 ERA, WAR, OPS, K/9, K/BB, HR/9, BABIP, AVG and WHIP are all at the best levels in 2010 
compared to any other year in the sample period. 
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correlated with every statistic except for those related to pitch types. We can also see 
from Table 3 that ERA, AVG, WHIP, WPA, REW, and HR/9 are all highly correlated 
with the OPS statistic. Table 4 shows ERA, BABIP, AVG, WPA, REW, and xFIP’s12 
high correlation with OPS.  
Table 5 presents the regression results testing whether an increase in fastball use 
leads to an increase in OPS for the years 2007-2010. Regressing pitch types on OPS, the 
more fastballs a starting pitcher throws, the higher his OPS is. This finding is in 
agreement with Kovash and Levitt’s (2009). Increasing a starting pitcher’s fastball use by 
one percent increases his OPS by 0.064. The economic significance of this effect is not 
negligible. The top-five batting leaders in OPS during the 2010 season were all within 
0.049 of each other. An extra 0.064 in OPS can redefine a good hitter into a superstar 
hitter. As for relief pitchers, none of the coefficients were statistically significant. This 
suggests either that the sample size is not large enough or that their choices are in 
accordance with the minimax theory. We will delve further into this phenomenon when 
we discuss Table 8.  
Tables 6 and 7 test whether there is a difference in WAR between pitchers who 
threw more fastballs and those who threw fewer. From 2007-2010, 318 starting pitchers 
threw fewer fastballs in one season compared to the one before, while 216 starting 
pitchers threw more. In the same period, 340 relief pitchers threw fewer fastballs in one 
season compared to the one before, while 307 relievers threw more. These t-tests show a 
difference in WAR between those who threw more fastballs in one season compared to 
                                                           
12
 ERA – Earned Run Average. AVG – Batting Average Against. WHIP – Walks + Hits per Innings 
Pitched. WPA – Wins Probability Added. REW – Run Expectancy Wins. BABIP – Batting Average of 
Balls In Play. xFIP – Expected Fielding Independent Pitching.  For more information, refer to Appendix A. 
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the one before and those who did not. On average, starting pitchers increased their own 
value when they threw fewer fastballs; relief pitchers decreased their value when they 
threw fewer fastballs, but not as much as they would have if they increased their fastball 
use. These tables imply that starting pitchers are better off throwing fewer fastballs. That 
a relief pitcher’s value decreases whether or not he throws more fastballs might indicate 
that they are throwing fastballs close to the optimal frequency.   
Table 8 tests the difference in fastball use between starting pitchers and relief 
pitchers. By analyzing this difference, we can further explain why starting and relieving 
pitchers employ such different strategies. A fastball is usually a pitcher’s best pitch;13 
thus, we should expect relievers to throw more fastballs than starters. On average, starting 
pitchers threw a fastball 60% of the time while relievers threw one 61.5% of the time. 
While 1.5% may not seem like a lot, the context behind these numbers is noteworthy. 
Starting pitchers typically have four different pitches that they can throw, yet they choose 
to throw a fastball 60% of the time. Relief pitchers typically only have two choices, so 
throwing a fastball 61.5% of the time seems more reasonable. The results from Table 8 
along with the results from Table 5 hint that the choices relief pitchers make may follow 
minimax theory. However, we cannot decidedly conclude that they do, since our data set 
does not analyze each individual pitch a relief pitcher has thrown,  
Graphs 1 and 2 show an inverse relationship between WAR and OPS for both 
starters and relievers. Column (1) of Table 9 reports the regression results of OPS on 
                                                           
13
 It is generally accepted that pitchers should throw their fastball a lot, even if it means giving up a few 
more hits during the course of the game or season. This way, pitchers will have “saved” their best pitches 
for later, more crucial, situations. For example, a pitcher will not throw his best pitch with two outs and 
nobody on base in the second inning; he saves it for situations such as when the bases are loaded with one 
out in the seventh inning.   
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WAR for starting pitchers. OPS alone explains 38% of the variation in WAR. An 
increase in OPS by 0.100 decreases a starting pitcher’s WAR by almost 1win. Column 
(2) shows the impact IP has on WAR, but it is omitted from Column (3) due to its 
inherent correlation with the other explanatory variables. Moreover, we omit the BABIP, 
AVG, WHIP, WPA, REW, xFIP and HR/9 variables for the same reason. Column (3) 
adds a group of explanatory variables to the regression. With these additions, OPS’ 
impact on WAR decreases to 0.6 wins. Column (3) also tells us that an increase in the 
K/BB ratio by 1 increases a pitcher’s value by more than half a game. In other words, if 
two pitchers both walked two batters in nine innings, the pitcher who struck out four 
more batters could win one more game for his team than the batter who struck out fewer. 
Intuitively these results make sense, because a pitcher that allows fewer base runners 
certainly has more value than a pitcher who does not.  We also see a statistically 
significant coefficient for fastball percentage on a pitcher’s WAR, informing us that a 
10% increase in fastball use lowers a pitcher’s value by 0.14 wins.  
Column (1) of Table 10 reports the regression results of OPS on WAR for relief 
pitchers. OPS alone explains 35% of the variation in WAR. An increase in OPS by 0.100 
decreases WAR by 0.3 wins. Column (2) shows the impact IP has on WAR for relief 
pitchers, but it too is omitted from Column (3) for the same reasons as above. Adding 
other explanatory variables to the regression decreases OPS’s impact on WAR to about 
0.07 wins. These results indicate that OPS does not have as much of an impact on a relief  
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pitchers’ value as it does for a starting pitcher.14 Instead, the explanatory variable that has 
the most impact on WAR is the HR/9 ratio. An increase in the HR/9 ratio by 1 decreases 
a relief pitcher’s value by 0.4 wins. These results make sense as well. In general, starting 
pitchers do not want to allow base runners because the more batters they face, the more 
tired they get. Due to their short outings, this does not matter as much for relievers. As 
long as a relief pitcher does not allow a run, he will have pitched an effective inning. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that the HR/9 ratio affects a pitcher’s value more than OPS. 
Granted, if a base runner does score, a relief pitcher’s value is affected which explains 
why OPS still has some effect. The coefficient for fastball percentage is not statistically 
significant for relief pitchers.  
Based on the regression analysis of WAR on the explanatory variables, our results 
are in accordance with Kovash and Levitt’s (2009) conclusions for starting pitchers only. 
In general, starting pitchers are throwing too many fastballs and the overreliance on this 
pitch is adversely affecting their performance potential. Decreases in fastball use can lead 
to decreases in OPS. As for relief pitchers, our data does not find any significant 
relationship between fastball percentage and OPS. This might suggest that relief pitchers 
do follow the minimax theory with respect to equalizing payoffs. Our data does not have 
enough information to conclude anything on serial correlation however.  
OPS plays a large role in explaining the variation in WAR. Nevertheless, other 
statistics also contribute to a pitcher’s value. The K/BB statistic has the largest effect on a 
                                                           
14
 Additionally, because of their different roles, starting pitchers inherently have more value to a team than 
relief pitchers. Starting pitchers throw more innings and are in the game much longer than any relief 
pitcher, so they are more responsible for the outcome of a game. This reason also contributes to why OPS 
has a smaller effect for relief pitchers’ WAR than it does for starting pitchers.  
16 
 
starting pitcher’s OPS while the HR/9 has the largest effect for relief pitcher’s OPS. 
Teams must be wary of these other statistics in order to properly evaluate these pitchers.  
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This paper analyzes pitching data from 2007-2010 in order to (1) study minimax 
behavior in a natural setting by professionals in a high stakes environment, and (2) 
observe what OPS tells us about a pitcher’s value. This study also makes some 
corrections on oversights that Kovash and Levitt (2009) make. Today’s starting pitchers 
are throwing too many fastballs, and substantial deviations in minimax theory still exist 
in baseball. They are not implementing the most efficient strategies against batters; 
starters might find more success if they make small tweaks in the number of fastballs 
they throw over a given season. As for relievers, our results imply that relief pitchers mix 
their pitches well enough that their choices may follow minimax. However, due to data 
limitations, we cannot make conclusive statements proving this. Further analysis on each 
individual pitch thrown by relief pitchers is needed. 
In addition, “high stakes alone are not sufficient to ensure that optimal decision-
making will ensue, even among professionals operating in their natural environments” 
18 
 
(Kovash and Levitt, 2009). If coaches emphasize mixing pitches more often, starting 
pitchers can expect more success. This assertion is backed up by the data.15 2010 has 
been deemed the “year of the pitcher” due to an unusual spike in no-hitters, perfect games 
and general pitching dominance. (Evan Drellich, 2010) Thanks to the lowest fastball 
percentage in four years, starters during the 2010 season have recorded the lowest OPS, 
HR/9, BABIP, WHIP, AVG, and ERA, while recording highs in WAR, K/BB. These 
milestones were met with fewer pitchers who threw more innings on average than in the 
previous 3 seasons, further illustrating their dominance in 2010.  
We find that while OPS is a good indicator of a pitcher’s value, it is not the only 
important predictor of his value. Other indicators, such as K/BB for starters and HR/9 for 
relievers, also play important roles in predicting a pitcher’s value to his team. In addition, 
IP plays an integral part in predicting pitching success, at the very most due to its 
correlation with other pitching statistics. The general manager that successfully evaluates 
pitchers by analyzing these statistics may be able to find undervalued pitchers that can 
help generate more wins. 
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 In 2008, Brian Bannister, a starting pitcher for the Kansas City Royals, threw fastballs 59.6% of the time 
and batters owned a 0.826 OPS against him. That season, his WAR was 1.5, indicating that he provided one 
and a half more wins to his team than any random replacement player. In 2009, he drastically dropped his 
use of his fastball and only threw it 16.8% of the time, a -71.8% change. This time around, batters had an 
OPS of 0.713 against him, and his WAR increased to 2.9. Finally, this past season in 2010, his reliance on 
fastballs increased to 33.9%, a 101.8% change. Batters had an OPS of 0.871, while he obtained a WAR of 
0.0. He provided no more value to his team than any other replacement player. 
Another pitcher that benefitted greatly from cutting his reliance on fastballs is Minnesota Twins starting 
pitcher, Francisco Liriano. Coming off Tommy John Surgery that caused him to miss the entire 2007 
season, Francisco Liriano only pitched in 14 games in 2008. In these 14 games, 53.6% of his pitchers were 
fastballs, resulting in an OPS of 0.719. That season, he had a WAR of 1.5. The next season, he increased 
his workload to 29 games. He threw his fastball 56.5% of the time, a 5.4% increase. Liriano’s 2009 
statistics included an OPS of 0.831 and a WAR of 1.1. Finally, last season, in 31 games, Francisco Liriano 
threw his fastball at a rate of 48.6%, a 14% decrease from the previous year. In this season, batters recorded 
an OPS of 0.670 and Liriano posted a WAR of 6.0. By relying less on his fastball, Francisco Liriano was 
able to increase his value to the Minnesota Twins by almost 5 wins, and due to his fantastic performance, 
Francisco Liriano was awarded the 2010 Comeback Player of the Year in 2010. 
19 
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Appendix A 
Glossary of Baseball Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Definitions retrieved from Fangraphs.com and Wikipedia unless otherwise noted) 
 
AVG - Batting Average Against – a statistic that measures a pitcher’s ability to prevent 
hits during official at bats.  
 
BABIP – Batting average for balls in play – a statistic measuring the percentage of plate 
appearances ending with a batted ball in play (excluding home runs) for which the batter 
is credited with a hit. BABIP is commonly used as a red flag in baseball statistical 
analysis, as a consistently high or low BABIP is hard to maintain – much more so for 
pitchers than hitters. Therefore, BABIP can be used to spot fluky seasons by pitchers, as 
those whose BABIPs are extremely high can often be expected to improve in the 
following season, and those pitchers whose BABIPs are extremely low can often be 
expected to regress in the following season. A normal BABIP is around .300, though the 
baseline regression varies depending on the quality of the team’s defense. The equation 
for BABIP is: 
 
 
  
  	   
 
 
 
ERA – Earned Run Average – the mean of earned runs given up by a pitcher per nine 
innings pitched. An earned run is any run for which the pitcher is held accountable (i.e. 
the run scored as a result of normal pitching and not due to a fielding error or a passed 
ball). ERAs can be roughly interpreted as follows 
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ERA Notes 
< 2.00 Exceptional. Achieved very rarely 
2.00 - 3.00 Excellent. Only achieved by best pitchers in the 
league 
3.00 - 4.00 Better than average 
4.00 - 5.00 Average 
5.00 - 6.00 Worse than average 
> 6.00 Very poor. Performance this consistently weak 
usually leads to reduction of pitching duties and 
possible demotion to a lower league 
 
HR/9 – Home runs allowed per 9 innings – the average number of home runs given up by 
a pitcher per nine innings pitched 
 
IP – Innings pitched – the number of innings a pitcher has completed, measured by the 
number of batters and base runners that are put out while the pitcher on the pitching 
mound in a game. 
 
K/ 9 – Strikeouts per 9 innings – The average of how many batters a pitcher strikes out 
per 9 innings pitched.  
 
K/BB – Strikeouts to Walks Ratio – A pitcher’s ratio of strikes to walks. Measures a 
pitcher’s ability to control pitches. 
 
OPS – on-base percentage plus slugging percentage – The sum of on base percentage and 
slugging percentage. The on base percentage formula is defined below: 
 
   
  
    ! "!
  
 
The slugging percentage formula is defined as follows: 
 
#$   
%&'()*+, 
 %2 . /012)*+, 
 %3 . 45&6)*+, 
 %4 . 08* 1'+,
9 :9+
 
 
Captures a hitter’s ability to get on base and hit for power in a simple way so he can be 
compared to every other player. “In prior empirical research, OPS has been shown to be a 
strong predictor of the number of runs a team scores. (Fox, 2006) To conceptualize this 
statistic better, the following table provides a scale that OPS can be graded upon (James, 
2010) 
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OPS Interval Grade 
.9000 and Above Excellent (A)   
.8333 to .8999 Very Good (B) 
.7667 to .8333 Good (C) 
.7000 to .7666 Average (D) 
.6334 to .6999 Fair (E) 
.5667 to .6333 Poor (F) 
.5666 and Lower Very Poor (G) 
  
 
 
REW – Run Expectancy Wins - REW is the same as RE24, except it has been converted 
to a wins scale. RE24 is the difference in run expectancy (RE) between the start of the 
play and the end of the play. That difference is then credited/debited to the batter and the 
pitcher. Over the course of the season, each players’ RE24 for individual plays is added 
up to get his season total RE24. 
 
SwStr% - Percentage of pitches that induced a swinging strike. 
 
WHIP – Walks + Hits per inning pitched – Advanced baseball statistical measurement of 
the number of base runners a pitcher has allowed per inning pitched. It is a measure of a 
pitcher’s ability to prevent batters from reaching base. 
 
WPA – Win Probability Added - WPA is the difference in win expectancy (WE) between 
the start of the play and the end of the play. That difference is then credited/debited to the 
batter and the pitcher. Over the course of the season, each players’ WPA for individual 
plays is added up to get his season total WPA. 
 
xFIP – Expected Fielding Independent Pitching – (HR x 13 + (BB + HBP - IBB) x 3 - K 
x 2) / IP, plus a league-specific factor (usually around 3.2). Eliminate everything a pitcher 
can't control (defense, park effects, bloop singles, etc.) and concentrate on the stuff he can 
control (strikeouts, walks, home runs, etc.). Also corrects HR/fly ball rate to the expected 
level, covering any pitcher who had bad luck with a couple of wind-blown homers or 
wall-scrapers. Interpreted on same scale as ERA.  
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Appendix B 
Tables 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Starting Pitchers 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average Max Min Average Max Min Average Max Min Average Max Min 
WAR 1.3 (1.7) 7.1 -1.1 
1.4 
(1.7) 7.6 -1.3 
1.4 
(1.8) 9.4 -1.5 
1.6 
(1.8) 7.0 -1.6 
OPS 0.810 (0.120) 1.357 0.525 
0.792 
(0.116) 1.238 0.552 
0.794 
(0.103) 1.174 0.519 
0.758 
(0.099) 1.115 0.459 
ERA 5.24 (2.01) 15.55 1.54 
5.07 
(1.92) 16.4 1.83 
5.00 
(1.65) 13.06 2.16 
4.51 
(1.4) 11.08 0.9 
K/9 6.02 (1.75) 11.44 1.74 
6.2 
(1.8) 12.86 2.13 
6.32 
(1.7) 10.91 2.23 
6.53 
(1.62) 12.18 3.09 
BB/9 3.44 (1.3) 8.18 0.71 
3.57 
(1.57) 12.91 0.67 
3.52 
(1.33) 10.45 1.14 
3.34 
(1.23) 8.61 0.76 
K/BB 2.03 (1.1) 10 0.4 
2.03 
(1.05) 10 0.23 
2.04 
(0.96) 5.94 0.33 
2.22 
(1.08) 10.28 0.5 
HR/9 1.24 (0.67) 4.63 0 
1.18 
(0.54) 3.57 0 
1.22 
(0.52) 3.48 0 
1.08 
(0.48) 3.08 0 
IP 104.13 (72.24) 241 10.3 
104.73 
(73.55) 253 10 
105.22 
(69.67) 240 10.3 
120.63 
(71.86) 250.7 10 
Balls 628.9 (414.95) 1495 50 
633.2 
(418.2) 1408 64 
642.6 
(400.2) 1395 59 
723.2 
(410.7) 1424 55 
Strikes 1065.2 (727.9) 2409 91 
1074.3 
(743.2) 2530 97 
1083.8 
(700.1) 2635 116 
1235.8 
(724.7) 2450 96 
Pitches 
Thrown 
1694.1 
(1138.31) 3692 152 
1707.5 
(1157.2) 3814 161 
1726.4 
(1095.8) 3937 177 
1959 
(1130.7) 3748 151 
% Strikes 0.6200 (0.03) 0.7283 0.5256 
0.6209 
(0.0294) 0.6929 0.5071 
0.6235 
(0.0272) 0.6929 0.5272 
0.6255 
(0.0253) 0.7114 0.5515 
BABIP 0.313 (0.04) 0.453 0.188 
0.310 
(0.042) 0.494 0.189 
0.308 
(0.038) 0.464 0.173 
0.304 
(0.035) 0.462 0.179 
AVG 0.284 (0.038) 0.434 0.190 
0.277 
(0.039) 0.43 0.190 
0.276 
(0.037) 0.423 0.140 
0.268 
(0.032) 0.415 0.151 
WHIP 1.51 (0.29) 2.83 1.03 
1.49 
(0.30) 2.77 1.0 
1.48 
(0.27) 2.71 1.0 
1.41 
(0.24) 2.42 0.76 
WPA -0.10 (1.38) 4.33 -3.50 
-0.07 
(1.42) 5.96 -3.73 
-0.07 
(1.41) 6.07 -2.98 
0.31 
(1.52) 5.70 -3.41 
REW -0.12 (1.41) 3.83 -3.85 
-0.09 
(1.45) 5.04 -3.49 
-0.07 
(1.46) 6.01 -3.63 
0.27 
(1.58) 5.71 -4.23 
SwStr% 0.077 (0.021) 0.161 0.024 
0.076 
(0.021) 0.15 0.03 
0.078 
(0.019) 0.153 0.028 
0.077 
(0.019) 0.130 0.034 
xFIP 4.89 (0.81) 7.61 2.58 
4.67 
(0.80) 8.04 2.57 
4.66 
(0.82) 9.16 2.82 
4.47 
(0.72) 7.59 2.15 
FB% 0.6063 (0.09) 0.808 0.136 
0.6046 
(0.1022) 0.826 0.133 
0.5932 
(0.1103) 0.900 0.071 
0.5762 
(0.0974) 0.819 0.125 
CB% 0.0975 (0.0802) 0.342 0.000 
0.0974 
(0.0823) 0.354 0.000 
0.1008 
(0.0830) 0.368 0.000 
0.1002 
(0.0788) 0.365 0.000 
SL% 0.12 (0.09) 0.505 0.000 
0.1289 
(0.0973) 0.486 0.000 
0.1307 
(0.1004) 0.388 0.000 
0.1274 
(0.0938) 0.369 0.000 
CH% 0.13 (0.07) 0.450 0.000 
0.1183 
(0.0772) 0.457 0.000 
0.1144 
(0.0725) 0.392 0.000 
0.1304 
(0.0765) 0.334 0.000 
Max 89.4 (2.8) 95.8 74.2 
89.8 
(2.7) 94.9 72.9 
90.2 
(2.6) 96.1 72.4 
90.3 
(2.7) 97.3 72.9 
Diff 13.6 (3.1) 21.6 5.2 
14.0 
(3.2) 26.5 6.3 
13.7 
(3.3) 23.3 6.1 
13.7 
(3.1) 28 5.8 
Count 268 267 266 239 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Relief Pitchers 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average max min Average max min average max min average max min 
WAR 0.4 (0.7) 3.2 -1.1 
0.3 
(0.7) 3.3 -1.3 
0.3 
(0.7) 2.9 -1.0 
0.3 
(0.7) 3.1 -1.5 
OPS 0.744 (0.132) 1.231 0.440 
0.731 
(0.138) 1.209 0.000 
0.744 
(0.138) 1.194 0.315 
0.725 
(0.135) 1.246 0.403 
ERA 4.46 (1.90) 12.15 0.38 
4.22 
(1.77) 12.46 0.00 
4.39 
(1.93) 13.50 0.60 
4.13 
(1.77) 11.32 0.00 
K/9 7.2 (2.2) 14.9 0.8 
7.3 
(2.1) 13.1 2.0 
7.4 
(2.1) 14.9 1.6 
7.8 
(2.4) 17.4 1.5 
K/BB 2.2 (1.3) 13.0 0.1 
2.2 
(1.3) 12.8 0.5 
2.2 
(1.4) 13.0 0.3 
2.4 
(1.5) 12.0 0.5 
HR/9 0.9 (0.6) 3.7 0.0 
1.0 
(0.6) 3.1 0.0 
1.0 
(0.7) 4.5 0.0 
0.9 
(0.6) 4.2 0.0 
IP 42.2 (22.2) 93.2 10.0 
43.2 
(21.7) 89.1 10.0 
41.0 
(22.1) 89.1 10.1 
40.7 
(20.9) 92.0 10.0 
Balls 265.3 (131.5) 571.0 54.0 
275.3 
(135.9) 637.0 42.0 
263.7 
(136.6) 602.0 36.0 
256.5 
(124.9) 582.0 52.0 
Strikes 438.8 (227.6) 1016.0 93.0 
450.2 
(225.0) 929.0 73.0 
428.8 
(227.6) 886.0 88.0 
424.1 
(213.8) 991.0 99.0 
Pitches 
Thrown 
704.1 
(355.7) 1533.0 150.0 
725.4 
(357.9) 1509.0 115.0 
692.5 
(361.5) 1477.0 131.0 
680.6 
(335.9) 1573.0 155.0 
% 
Strikes 
0.6200 
(0.0328) 0.7304 0.5373 
0.6182 
(0.0307) 0.7033 0.5236 
0.6156 
(0.0323) 0.7322 0.5027 
0.6196 
(0.0311) 0.7313 0.5380 
BABIP 0.306 (0.050) 0.521 0.125 
0.299 
(0.050) 0.507 0.111 
0.302 
(0.051) 0.476 0.104 
0.304 
(0.050) 0.487 0.140 
batting 
avg 
against 
0.261 
(0.047) 0.408 0.135 
0.254 
(0.046) 0.450 0.093 
0.257 
(0.049) 0.430 0.111 
0.253 
(0.047) 0.462 0.134 
WHIP 1.44 (0.33) 2.85 0.63 
1.41 
(0.30) 2.77 0.29 
1.45 
(0.33) 2.63 0.59 
1.40 
(0.33) 3.00 0.68 
WPA 0.24 (1.10) 5.98 -2.70 
0.15 
(1.08) 5.37 -3.02 
0.16 
(1.09) 5.13 -4.54 
0.30 
(1.11) 5.19 -2.70 
REW 0.15 (0.87) 3.24 -1.57 
0.14 
(0.79) 2.59 -2.14 
0.13 
(0.78) 2.59 -2.43 
0.21 
(0.83) 2.54 -2.33 
SwStr% 0.0946 (0.0259) 0.1960 0.0380 
0.0926 
(0.0247) 0.1790 0.0300 
0.0908 
(0.0242) 0.1790 0.0300 
0.0932 
(0.0242) 0.1640 0.0270 
xFIP 4.70 (0.89) 7.61 2.42 
4.44 
(0.81) 6.88 2.16 
4.54 
(0.89) 8.04 2.05 
4.30 
(0.91) 7.98 1.87 
FB% 0.6128 (0.1180) 0.9480 0.1830 
0.6207 
(0.1210) 0.9130 0.1200 
0.6137 
(0.1338) 0.8990 0.0710 
0.6144 
(0.1294) 0.9040 0.1150 
CB% 0.1032 (0.0910) 0.4620 0.0010 
0.1041 
(0.0940) 0.3670 0.0010 
0.1195 
(0.1007) 0.4360 0.0010 
0.1357 
(0.0935) 0.5310 0.0020 
SL% 0.2060 (0.1232) 0.5710 0.0030 
0.2103 
(0.1302) 0.6080 0.0010 
0.2085 
(0.1295) 0.6540 0.0010 
0.2185 
(0.1218) 0.6500 0.0010 
CH% 0.0965 (0.0881) 0.5400 0.0010 
0.0809 
(0.0839) 0.3890 0.0010 
0.0948 
(0.0888) 0.3880 0.0010 
0.0985 
(0.0881) 0.4900 0.0010 
Max 90.7 (2.8) 97.5 78.6 
91.0 
(2.8) 97.5 79.6 
91.4 
(2.8) 99.3 78.2 
91.7 
(2.9) 99.9 72.8 
Diff 12.3 (3.2) 22.9 4.6 
12.2 
(3.3) 22.4 0.3 
12.2 
(3.4) 21.6 0.4 
12.16 
(3.3) 22.5 1.1 
Count 344 332 350 332 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix for Starting Pitchers 
 
ERA WAR OPS K/9 BB/9 K/BB HR/9 IP % Strikes BABIP FB% CB% SL% CH% 
ERA 1.0000 
             WAR -0.5441 1.0000 
            OPS 0.8798 -0.6195 1.0000 
           K/9 -0.2826 0.449 -0.3661 1.0000 
          BB/9 0.4801 -0.4191 0.3929 0.0158 1.0000 
         K/BB -0.4337 0.5849 -0.452 0.5157 -0.6554 1.0000 
        HR/9 0.6071 -0.5038 0.6992 -0.1628 0.1671 -0.204 1.0000 
       IP -0.4862 0.7938 -0.4956 0.2505 -0.3947 0.3721 -0.3378 1.0000 
      % Strikes -0.4074 0.4505 -0.3675 0.1888 -0.7705 0.6806 -0.1498 0.3795 1.0000 
     BABIP 0.5576 -0.1108 0.5931 0.1022 0.1299 -0.0071 0.0537 -0.1997 -0.0589 1.0000 
    FB% 0.1011 -0.0958 0.0695 -0.0078 0.1458 -0.1281 -0.0237 -0.1155 -0.1547 0.0853 1.0000 
   CB% -0.0198 0.0772 -0.0053 0.0698 -0.0347 0.0697 0.0079 0.0231 0.0102 0.0157 -0.199 1.0000 
  SL% -0.0728 0.0416 -0.0735 0.0916 -0.0434 0.0567 -0.0452 0.0633 0.0796 -0.0063 -0.044 -0.4904 1.0000 
 CH% 0.0527 -0.1085 0.0807 -0.0878 0.0043 -0.0455 0.0858 -0.093 -0.0318 -0.0032 -0.0779 -0.1745 -0.2426 1.0000 
Max -0.1727 0.3166 -0.222 0.4057 0.0196 0.1927 -0.1901 0.1594 0.0311 0.0416 0.3692 0.0079 0.1511 -0.181 
Diff -0.1497 0.1506 -0.1402 0.1157 -0.0681 0.1106 -0.106 0.1391 0.0956 -0.0715 -0.0194 0.3118 -0.1439 -0.1331 
AVG 0.7831 -0.4499 0.8779 -0.397 0.1584 -0.2934 0.4171 -0.3871 -0.1785 0.8157 0.0696 -0.0134 -0.0586 0.0613 
WHIP 0.8601 -0.5614 0.8724 -0.2829 0.6735 -0.578 0.4079 -0.5143 -0.5565 0.6829 0.1317 -0.0266 -0.071 0.0511 
WPA -0.6058 0.7306 -0.6388 0.3471 -0.3087 0.4711 -0.3921 0.4579 0.3422 -0.3534 -0.0695 0.0585 -0.0131 -0.025 
REW -0.6376 0.7422 -0.6645 0.3418 -0.3305 0.4827 -0.408 0.4691 0.3618 -0.3796 -0.0768 0.0568 -0.0073 -0.0301 
%SwStr -0.3723 0.4634 -0.4278 0.7425 -0.1495 0.4835 -0.2236 0.3032 0.3207 -0.0399 -0.1255 -0.0565 0.1287 0.0883 
xFIP 0.529 -0.4458 0.4861 -0.3766 0.4965 -0.4937 0.3021 -0.3424 -0.4088 0.1122 0.0717 -0.0288 -0.0766 0.0889 
 
 
Max Diff AVG WHIP WPA REW %SwStr xFIP 
Max 1.0000 
       Diff 0.1496 1.0000 
      AVG -0.2044 -0.1455 1.0000 
     WHIP -0.1378 -0.1427 0.8309 1.0000 
    WPA 0.2522 0.141 -0.5763 -0.584 1.0000 
   REW 0.2539 0.1486 -0.6001 -0.6151 0.966 1.0000 
  %SwStr 0.3332 0.0372 -0.4252 -0.3948 0.3839 0.3856 1.0000 
 xFIP -0.2013 -0.0799 0.3507 0.5421 -0.3802 -0.3865 -0.3689 1.0000 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Relief Pitchers 
 
 
ERA WAR OPS K/9 K/BB HR/9 IP %Strikes BABIP FB% CB% SL% CH% Max 
ERA 1 
             WAR -0.4979 1 
            OPS 0.8402 -0.5891 1 
           K/9 -0.2576 0.4448 -0.348 1 
          K/BB -0.3524 0.4989 -0.4026 0.4251 1 
         HR/9 0.5543 -0.4997 0.648 -0.1216 -0.0622 1 
        IP -0.3842 0.4276 -0.3808 0.2077 0.1768 -0.2382 1 
       %Strikes -0.2789 0.4121 -0.2812 0.1427 0.62 -0.0331 0.2714 1 
      BABIP 0.5731 -0.0782 0.6293 0.099 -0.0934 0.0619 -0.1862 -0.0425 1 
     FB% -0.0192 0.0376 -0.0513 0.0467 0.0022 -0.0742 0.0218 -0.0312 -0.0036 1 
    CB% -0.0159 -0.0244 0.017 -0.0523 -0.0655 -0.0167 -0.0688 -0.0743 -0.016 -0.144 1 
   SL% 0.0397 -0.0035 0.0269 0.1029 0.0064 0.0192 0.0134 0.0169 0.0644 -0.2803 -0.5213 1 
  CH% 0.0653 -0.1204 0.0909 -0.1364 -0.0712 0.122 -0.0865 -0.0513 -0.0286 -0.2312 -0.0767 -0.2061 1 
 Max -0.0801 0.194 -0.1577 0.3625 0.0754 -0.1233 0.1748 -0.0389 0.0392 0.3142 -0.0327 -0.0647 -0.2537 1 
Diff -0.0208 0.0341 -0.0017 0.0539 -0.0328 0.0024 0.0118 -0.0149 -0.0132 0.046 0.4251 -0.322 -0.0098 0.1252 
AVG 0.7642 -0.4093 0.8788 -0.4003 -0.2832 0.3874 -0.3126 -0.1039 0.8265 -0.0461 0.004 0.0154 0.0695 -0.1667 
WHIP 0.8031 -0.5233 0.8641 -0.2705 -0.5656 0.3436 -0.39 -0.4846 0.7239 -0.006 0.0097 0.0184 0.0502 -0.0713 
WPA -0.5163 0.6102 -0.5564 0.2778 0.3444 -0.2913 0.3842 0.2618 -0.3726 0.0168 -0.0072 -0.0113 -0.0986 0.1082 
REW -0.7559 0.6521 -0.7432 0.2957 0.3786 -0.4343 0.4551 0.2895 -0.5202 0.0196 -0.0029 -0.0333 -0.0802 0.1032 
%SwStr -0.2729 0.4088 -0.3385 0.7266 0.42 -0.1029 0.253 0.2648 -0.0077 -0.127 -0.1736 0.2037 0.0483 0.2606 
xFIP 0.5483 -0.6517 0.5872 -0.6202 -0.6772 0.3248 -0.3818 -0.5318 0.0633 -0.0394 0.0141 -0.0287 0.1527 -0.2246 
 
 
 
Diff AVG WHIP WPA REW %SwStr xFIP 
Diff 1             
AVG -0.0344 1 
    
  
WHIP -0.013 0.8386 1 
   
  
WPA 0.0308 -0.524 -0.5355 1 
  
  
REW 0.026 -0.7004 -0.7176 0.7822 1 
 
  
%SwStr -0.0643 -0.3595 -0.329 0.2587 0.3001 1   
xFIP 0.013 0.424 0.6483 -0.4135 -0.5059 -0.5361 1 
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of OPS vs. Pitch Type for Starters and Relievers 
 
 Starting Pitchers Relief Pitchers 
Fastballs .0642905* 
(.0353666) 
-.0419765 
(.032503) 
Curveballs -.0516897 
(.0503779) 
.0393051 
(.0495116) 
Sliders -.1038196* 
(.0417578) 
.0297437 
(.0347514) 
R
2
 0.0108 0.0033 
Notes: The dependent variable is a pitcher’s OPS. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of 
observations is equal to 1,040 for starters and 1,357 for relievers. 
* p= <.1, **p = <.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table 6: T-Test: Difference in WAR Sample Mean for Starting Pitchers Who Increased Fastball 
Use vs. Those Who Decreased Fastball Use 
Decreased FB use  Increased FB use 
FB% Diff WAR Diff  FB% Diff WAR Diff 
-0.052 0.077 Average 0.036 -0.163 
0.051 1.644 Variance 0.035 1.65 
318 318 Count 216 216 
 
Results t df Two-tailed p-
value 
Standard Dev 
OPS 1.65 532 0.1 1.65 
 
Table 7: T-Test: Difference in WAR Sample Mean for Relief Pitchers Who Increased Fastball 
Use vs. Those Who Decreased Fastball Use 
Decreased FB use  Increased FB use 
FB% Diff WAR Diff  FB% Diff WAR Diff 
-0.069 -0.069 Average 0.056 -0.214 
0.003 0.606 Variance 0.002 0.703 
340 340 Count 307 307 
 
Results t df Two-tailed p-
value 
Standard Dev 
OPS 2.27 645 0.023 0.808 
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Table 8: T-Test: Difference in Fastball Use between Starting Pitchers and Relief Pitchers 
Starting Pitchers  Relief Pitchers 
Fastball %  Fastball % 
0.60 Average 0.615541 
0.100904 Variance 0.12554 
1040 Count 1357 
 
Results t df Right-tailed p-
value 
Standard Dev 
FB% 3.2649 2395 .00055 0.005 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1: Starting Pitcher’s WAR vs. OPS 
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Graph 2: Relief Pitcher’s WAR vs. OPS 
 
Table 9: Regression Analysis of WAR vs. Other Predictor Variables for Starting Pitchers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
OPS -9.764578*** 
(.384067) 
 -6.227705*** 
(.3934314) 
K/BB   .5488333*** 
(.0431176) 
IP  .019386*** 
(.0004611) 
 
Pitch Speed 
Differential 
  .016445 
(.012003) 
Max velocity   .108701*** 
(.0166157) 
SwStr%   6.017285** 
(2.310465) 
Fastball %   -1.377262** 
(.4196499) 
Constant   -4.415718** 
(1.417009) 
R
2 
0.3838 0.6301 0.5333 
Notes: The dependent variable is a pitcher’s WAR. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of 
observations is equal to 1,040 in all columns. 
* p= <.1, **p = <.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 10: Regression Analysis of WAR vs. Other Predictor Variables for Relief Pitchers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
OPS -3.030339*** 
(.1129083) 
 -.7480672*** 
(.1459109) 
IP  .0136603*** 
(.0007845) 
 
 
K/BB   .120852*** 
(.0132164) 
HR/9   -.3941003*** 
(.027985) 
% Strikes   3.725498*** 
(.5213681) 
Max Velocity   .015737** 
(.0051231) 
Pitch Speed 
Differential 
  .0099467* 
(.003961) 
SwStr%   4.584408*** 
(.6252883) 
Fastball %   .0357626 
(.1114758) 
Constant   -3.297502*** 
(.5752681) 
R
2
 0.3471 0.1828 0.5183 
Notes: The dependent variable is a pitcher’s WAR. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. The number of 
observations is equal to 1,358 in all columns. 
* p= <.1, **p = <.01, *** p<.001 
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